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Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazara, Uzbeks and others. These pre-existing fractures eroded internal coherence from 
the get-go. Western armed forces lacked cultural or historical competences to appropriately train, or 
establish professionalism, among the Afghan army. 
1
The Afghan National Army, much like the underlying society, has historic ethnic 
fractures which eroded internal coherence from the get-go 
Resolute Support's final transition from military-assisted state-building and democratisation to civilian 
political agents was unrealistic even before the recent crisis unfolded. No one had sketched out how 
strengthening police and military forces would ultimately result in rule of law where young and fragile 
civilian institutions could retain supremacy over older and more institutionalised military and paramilitary 
forces. 
lt was, in the main, foreign military forces which planned and led the stabilisation process. Such a process 
could very weil result in the same civil-military imbalances that have underpinned the stubborn democratic 
deficit across the Middle East since colonial independence. 
Joining the dots between military and democracy 
'Winning hearts and minds' served only to import Western foreign troops' goals rather than to grow 
domestic institutions organically. Understanding the operational environment was a major aspect of 
counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. But it was never truly applied to forge a system of governance that could 
survive historic legacies and ongoing instability. lnstead, Western troops merely used it to combat 
insurgents more effectively. 
Western military forces never understood the operational environment in 
Afghanistan weil enough to forge a government that could survive ongoing 
instability in the region 
Within a matter of days, the work of the last two decades collapsed like a hause of cards. This was, in large 
part, due to nobody knowing what type of democratic endgame was needed in Afghanistan to stick, 
regardless of foreign presence. 
A frictionless transition from foreign militaries to local political agents is hardly possible if the militaries 
implementing this transition are already struggling to formulate concrete steps for a military-to-civilian 
handover. The US military and its allies had become so deeply entangled in Afghanistan's stability that they 
couldn't leave without the democratic achievements unravelling. 
The failure of Resolute Support should concern scholars as much as policymakers. Nation building, 
democratisation, and military behaviour are often studied separately. Likewise, policymakers 
compartmentalise these issues, or focus on one at the expense of the others. 
For most former colonies, military behaviour - whether of foreign or domestic forces - plays a decisive role in 
state-building. Recent violent events in Afghanistan show how, ultimately, military behaviour is also 
essential to a nation's democratic survival. 
This article presents the views of the author(s} and not necessarily those of the ECPR or the Editors of The 
Loop. 
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